Over the last 30 years, as legislative party polarization has increased, bipartisan compromise has become normatively more appealing and apparently less attainable.
While an extensive literature is devoted to the antecedents and consequences of party polarization and gridlock, almost no attention has been devoted to the individual legislator level foundations of these aggregate level phenomena. Here I examine the factors that determine the extent to which individual legislators spend time on forming cross-party coalitions-bipartisanship. It is these individual actions shaped by institutions, elections, and citizen and elite preferences that determine collective outcomes, including party polarization and gridlock.
The analysis will ultimately be based on two national surveys of state legislators conducted 7 years apart, but in this initial draft I examine only the 2002 survey.
Legislators were asked how much time each spent on building coalitions to pass legislation. They were asked separately about building coalitions within their own party and across parties. The first section describes the data and presents the basic descriptive information on the time legislators spend on each type of coalition building. I also show the variation in the fraction of total coalition building time members spend on cross-party coalition activity across the 99 state legislative chambers.
The second section summarizes the existing literature and develops hypotheses regarding the time legislators will spend on building bipartisan legislative coalitions.
Existing work focuses almost exclusively on chamber level measures and consequences legislative partisanship, respectively polarization and gridlock. And the vast bulk of this analysis is on Congress rather than state legislatures. Thus little attention is paid to institutional characteristics that are invariant, or relatively invariant, over time in Congress. Thus, congressional studies examine gridlock over time as dependent upon divided party control, party polarization and intraparty homogeneity (see for example, Binder 1999) but not upon legislative or leadership professionalization. Because these studies are aggregate level studies, they cannot model variation in bipartisan behavior at the level of the individual member.
The third section develops hypotheses to explain the time individual members report spending on bipartisan legislative coalition building and the fourth section tests these hypotheses using a survey of legislators conducted in 2002.
Legislators Cross-Party Coalition Building Activity.
In recent decades, scholars, citizens and pundits have all debated the extent and California, 1994 , Alabama, 1999 , Nevada, 1999 , Oregon, 1002 and Indiana, 2005 (Kurtz, 2011 .
These headline grabbing instances of gridlock reflect partisan polarization.
Polarization has been studied most extensively at the national level. Figure 1 shows the time legislators report spending on each type of coalition building. Each is a unimodal distribution with the median the middle scale position and each distribution has a slight negative skew-that is, the mass of the distribution is to the right of the mean. What is surprising is how similar the distributions are. As shown in The next section examines whether chamber differences in the relative time devoted to within and cross-party coalition building are theoretically explicable-a reasonable necessary, although not sufficient condition, for the value of these survey items.
Hypotheses
Although there is no scholarship directly on point, there is an extensive literature, primary on Congress, related to gridlock and polarization that is germane to modeling cross-party coalition building. As Binder (1999, 521) notes, "partisan theories of legislative gridlock traditionally have centered on the effect of divided government on policy outcomes." While there is considerable disagreement about the consequences of divided government for legislative productivity (Binder 1999; Mayhew 1991, Brady and Volden, 1998; Fiorina 1996) , expectations regarding its moderating effect on national policy outcomes are more straight forward. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) are among many who argue in favor of our intuitive understanding that divided government results in more moderate policy outcomes relative to undivided government by balancing the extremism of the two parties. Indeed they argue that voters understand the moderating effect of divided government and incorporate this understanding in their voting decisions.
With regard to the states rather than the federal government, if no single party controls the legislature (two chambers except in Nebraska) and holds the governorship, then policymaking is often the result of a bipartisan compromise.
While policy makers may intuitively understand the compromises that need to be made to craft legislation that will be supported by the legislature and governor, these results are more likely achieved by discussion and negotiation-that is, time spent building cross-party coalitions of support. In the Senate Ted Kennedy and Orrin Hatch, members from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, coauthored an impressive number of important social-welfare bills in precisely these circumstances. As Hatch described, "We disagreed on nearly every issue and continued to do so for all the years we served together in the Senate. But to our mutual surprise, during our service on the Senate Labor, Judiciary, and other committees, we soon realized that we could work well together. If the two of us-positioned as we were on opposite sides of the political spectrum-could find common ground, we had little trouble enlisting bipartisan support to pass critical legislation that benefited millions of Americans" (Newsweek 2009 ).
Individual state legislators must consider the partisan composition of their chamber and the other relevant branches of government in deciding how to build a legislative coalition to get their legislation enacted into law. First, most obviously, members of the minority party in a chamber must get some votes from majority party members to write a bill that can pass in their own chamber. (Majority members are coded 1, minority members 0 and the very small number of other or unaffiliated .5. Also coded .5 are the legislators in the 3 tied chambers. A dichotomous 1-0 variable for tied chambers will also be included in the model as a check on the validity of coding members in tied chambers as .5. While there are too few members in this circumstance to accurately estimate the effect of tied chambers it is important to control for ties to properly estimate the other chamber level parameters.)
Second, majority members in a chamber in a divided government state must also accommodate the views of the other party sufficiently to gain the support of members of the majority party in the other chamber, if that party differs from their own, and of the governor, if he is of the opposing party. In these circumstances, members who require (Zeller, 2011) .
A member of the majority party in a chamber could have some uncertainty about whether enough members of one's own party will vote for her legislation to for it to pass even in her own chamber. All else equal, the smaller the margin of majority control, the greater the risk of defeat for a majority member's legislation and hence the advantage of securing some support from the other party. The logic is not the same for a member of the minority party. The greater the margin of the majority party's control, the harder a minority member must work to secure a minimal winning coalition for their bill. Thus the relationship between the majority party's margin of control and the time a member devotes to building a cross-party coalition of support for her legislation should be negative for a majority member and positive for a minority member.
In some chambers a simple majority is insufficient to pass legislation. Members in these chambers need to build supermajorities and hence require minority support.
There are 15 chambers that, at the time of the survey, required a supermajority larger than that held by the majority party to pass legislation. These include chambers that require a supermajority either for a quorum or to cut off debate and call the question. Karl Kurtz writing in The Thicket at State Legislatures cited his colleague Brenda Erickson for compiling data on both types of supermajority requirements (2011, 2007) . (Texas has a 2/3 supermajority requirement for a quorum-its Senate's customary voting practice parallels its quorum requirement.)
Of course, these obstructive tactics may be costly for the members who engage in them--leaving the state to prevent a quorum is more than just inconvenient. If they are costly, they are likely to be reserved for important issues. Generally, members in these chambers should be expected to spend more time building cross-party legislative coalitions than members in other chambers.
There is a large literature debating the extent to which parties succeed in The measure of professionalism that John Carey, Dick Niemi and I developed based on member compensation, session length, and total expenditures on legislative administration Powell, 2000, and Moncrief, 2006 ) and the measure of leadership compensation I compiled (2012) will be used here as indicators of the powers of legislative leaders.
In general, the larger the state population, the more professional its legislature.
(The correlation between logged state population and professionalization is .69.) The diverse political and economic factions in these large states create complex legislative issues. The demands of constituency service also increase in proportion to constituency population size which is larger too in more populous states. For these reasons, the total time a legislator spend on her job is greater in more populous states and the defining features of legislative professionalization-legislator compensation, days in session and staff-increase roughly in proportion to state population size. Professionalization was intended to increase legislative capacity and to do so in part by more professional chamber leadership structures-structures which are likely to provide leaders with more leverage over party members. Leader compensation is particularly difficult to measure. While it is easy to distinguish chambers that provide very little compensation for leaders from those that provide significant compensation, it is not possible in many chambers to put a precise dollar value on the amount of additional compensation. For example, in some chambers, leaders are paid a salary for the days in the interim when they have official meetings, but the number of such days is not readily available. And the value of compensation for subordinate leaders, such as Minority Leaders or committee chairs, compared to the primary leader varies greatly across chambers as well. It is possible, however, to identify the 28 chambers that have minimal to no additional compensation for the highest chamber office a member can hold (most commonly Speaker or Senate President) 7 . Here chambers with significant compensation are coded 1 and the remainder 0.
An alternative to these measures would be to use items from the survey that ask respondents to indicate the power of the majority leader and of the minority leader to determine legislative outcomes in their chamber. However, these items ask about leaders influence over legislative outcomes not about the power of leaders over the policy conformity of members of their caucus. It is the latter that is of interest here. While the two types of influence are related they are not equivalent. The survey item asking about the influence of legislative leaders on outcomes is also dependent on the relative sizes of the majority and minority parties. For example (in multivariate analysis not shown here), the power of the minority leader over legislative outcomes is strongly negatively related to the size of the majority party's margin of control while the power of the majority party leader is more modestly positively related.
Ideological polarization between the parties and ideological coherence within parties are also features that have been identified as characteristics of polarization and causes of gridlock. The legislator survey asks members to place themselves on a 7-point ideological scale with the following labels: (1) Extremely Liberal (2) Liberal (3) Slightly 7 The Book of the States shows additional compensation for Presiding Officer, Majority Leader, Minority Leader and in some cases other leaders. Here I use the information on the highest paid internally elected leader. I distinguish between chambers with no or minimal compensation (less than $1000 per year), and those with more compensation.
States with no compensation in either chamber are: AZ, AR, MO (upper only), NE, NM, RI, SD, TX, VA and WI. The following states fall below $1000 per year: AK $500/yr, MT $5/day during session, NH $50 two-year term, NV $900/yr, WY $3/day. These data are shown in Tables 3.11 Constituency competitiveness has also been argued to promote bipartisanship in bill cosponsorship by pressuring "members from more competitive districts to show they are moderate and willing to work across the aisle" (Harbridge 2010, 2) . Constituency competitiveness may work through ideological moderation either by preferentially electing moderate candidates or by encouraging candidates to become more moderate in their platform to win and, subsequently in their legislative performance, to retain office.
While asking members to place themselves on the ideological dimension may elicit their sincere preference, it more likely reflects their public position. If constituency competitiveness works as hypothesized it should show a significant positive coefficient in the model absent member moderation, and no effect if moderation is included.
Finally, there are three individual level variables likely to be related to members' time allocation. We might expect committee chairs to spend more time on cross-party coalition building than ordinary members given their responsibilities for authoring and passing legislation. While party leaders are similarly responsible for passage of their party's legislative agenda, they may negotiate primarily with the leaders of the opposing party rather than its members and thus may spend less time on cross-party negotiation than committee chairs. Members with more tenure may, over time, have formed more relationships with members of the other party than more recently elected members, and these relationships are likely to foster greater legislative bipartisanship.
Empirical Analysis
The dependent variable in the analysis, time spent building legislative cross-party coalitions, is based on the responses of individual legislators. The independent variables test the hypotheses (expectations shown in Table 1 ) developed in the previous section. In addition, time spent building coalitions within one's own party is included as an individual level control variable in the model. Table 2 shows the coding of the independent variables. Nine of the IVs are measured at the individual level and five at the chamber level. Thus the data are multilevel in structure, and a Bayesian hierarchical model will be used to estimate the effects of the variables at both chamber and individual levels.
At the individual level, the model is as follows: At the chamber level, the chamber dummy variables, the α j , are modeled: Estimates of the individual and chamber level coefficients are shown in Table 3 which contains the mean coefficient values and their standard deviations. Statistical significance is based on the percentile distributions of the coefficients.
Consistent with the expectations from Table 1 , minority members in a chamber do spend more time building coalitions across parties to pass legislation relative to the amount of time they spend building coalitions within their own party. Table 4 shows the magnitude of effects for all the independent variables. In calculating the magnitude of effect of minority status, the comparison is made between members of the minority and majority--both in chambers of average size of margin of control. (It is necessary to specify a comparison value for margin of control because members' minority-majority status is interacted with size of majority in the model.) Minority members spend .74 units more time on bipartisan coalition building (on the 5-point scale) than majority members in average chambers. This is the largest magnitude of effect shown in Table 4 and is statistically significant at the .001 level. This reflects the simple reality that if a minority member wishes to see his legislation pass, some members of the majority must vote for it. members in tied chambers to majority members serving in chambers with average margins of control. Members in the tied chambers spend .36 units more time on building bipartisan coalitions than the baseline category. While this result is sensible, it should, of course, be viewed cautiously because of the number of tied chambers 8 .
Similarly, members who serve in divided governments (those in which no party has the majority in both chambers and occupies the governorship) recognize that for their legislation to be enacted into law it must secure bipartisanship support. Members in states with divided control spend .16 more units of time on bipartisan coalition building than members in states with unified government.
The effect of size of minority is, as hypothesized, different for members of the majority and minority. The larger the majority the less time majority members devote the building bipartisan legislative coalitions while the reverse is true for members of the minority. The magnitude of the effect is about equal for both-members in the majority in a chamber with margin of control one standard deviation above average spend about .12 unit less time than members of the majority in chambers with margins of control one standard deviation below average.
There are three variables related to the effects of ideology on bipartisanship.
First, the coefficient on member moderation is expected to be, and is, positive. More moderate members do indeed spend more time constructing bipartisan legislative coalitions. A member who is one standard deviation more moderate than average spends .15 units more time on bipartisan coalition building than a member who is one standard deviation below average. The ideological distances between the mean legislators in the two parties in a state has little effect although it has the correct direction of effect and is just statistically discernable at the .10 level. Theoretically, the greater the distance between the parties, the more gridlock, as it is harder for the parties to find common ground. (The minimum effect needed to be statistically discernable is large reflecting the standard error of this variable. There are simply few minority legislators, and hence respondents, in many states.)
Constituency partisan favorability is unrelated to time spent building legislative coalitions in the full model as shown. If member moderation is omitted from the model then the larger the fraction of constituents who identify with the opposing party, the more time the legislator spends on bipartisan coalition building. Thus the effects of constituency competition work largely or wholly by electing more moderate members or at least those who will adopt a moderate legislative agenda.
Committee chairs were expected to spend more time than other members on bipartisan coalition building and they do so, although, the actual effect, as shown in Table   4 , is modest. Chairs spend .07 units more time than others on this activity. Chamber and party leaders were expected to spend less time than chairs, and the coefficient on leaders is slightly negative and statistically insignificantly. Committee chairs, who are responsible for negotiating legislation that will be enacted into law, spend more time negotiating bipartisan coalitions than do leaders who, while they are responsible for the entire legislative agenda, may negotiate directly with the other party's leaders, not its more numerous caucus members and hence devote relatively less time to bipartisan activity.
Both committee chairs and legislative leaders may be strategically sensitive to the need to devote time to bipartisan negotiation-for example if their party controls both chambers by large margins and holds the governorship they might devote relatively less time than chairs and leaders, for example, in tied chambers or under divided government.
Such interactions are not included in the model estimated here. There are practical constraints in the number of interactions that can be estimated in a world of 99 chambers.
I am considering alternative model specifications to test for these effects.
Length of tenure is also positively associated with bipartisan activity, although the effect is small here also. The notion is that members who have been in the chamber 
Future Research
This research is an exploration of a new approach to longstanding areas of research-polarization and gridlock. Most of the basic findings are consistent with our understanding of the legislative process in our system of checks and balances.
Legislators, in trying to construct bills that can pass both chambers and will be signed into law by the governor (or that have enough support to override a gubernatorial veto), consider the partisan and ideological composition of these entities. If one party lacks control of all three institutions, legislators must secure bipartisan support to change the status quo. Thus I find that legislators in states with divided party control and legislators in chambers with supermajority requirements greater than the fraction of seats held by the majority party spend more time building bipartisan legislative coalitions than do members in other circumstances. Similarly, members of the minority, by necessity, spend more time than members of the majority on bipartisan coalition building.
Members of the majority devote more time to this activity the smaller their chamber majority, with the reverse relationship for minority members.
The factors outlined in the preceding paragraph operate at the chamber level.
Within chambers we can also determine which members are more likely to engage in cross-party coalition building. Most notably, ideology is important to determining which individual members devote time to bipartisan coalition building. Party moderates are more likely to create legislation closer to their ideal point with a bipartisan rather than a purely partisan legislative coalition. Thus party moderates spend more time on crossparty coalition building than party extremists.
These findings are theoretically expected and it is reassuring that they are Using the coefficients from Tables 3, I compute the difference in predicted change in time comparing a case one std deviation above the mean to a case one std deviation below. For dichotomous variables, high value is compared to low value.
